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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 26 Summer 1991 Number 4
THE IMPACT OF FORFEITURE STATUTES ON
OKLAHOMA LOAN TRANSACTIONS*
Doris J. Astlet and Lisa B. McKnightt
I. INTRODUCTION
Forfeiture laws, whether federal or state statutory or common law,
have historically plagued lenders, often with devastating results. Crimi-
nal forfeiture "represents an innovative attempt to call on our common
law heritage to meet an essentially modem problem", ' but this effort to
punish and deter a wrongdoer through the removal of the economic
means and proceeds of crime may unduly impact secured creditors. Of
particular concern with respect to Oklahoma loan transactions are those
federal and state forfeiture statutes adopted in the war against organized
crime and drugs, including, inter alia, the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization Act' ("RICO"), the Continuing Criminal Enterprises
Copyright © 1991 by Doris J. Astle and Lisa B. McKnight.
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1. United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1445 (E.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 20 (2nd Cir. 1989) (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 35193 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Poft)).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
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Act 3 (the "CCE"), the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 (the "Controlled Substances Act"), the Oklahoma Cor-
rupt Organizations Prevention Act' ("OCOPA"), and the Oklahoma
Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act6 (the "Oklahoma Con-
trolled Substances Act"). The primary questions which arise under these
statutes with respect to the impact of forfeiture on a secured creditor's
interest are: (i) what property is subject to forfeiture; (ii) whether forfei-
ture proceedings are criminal (i.e., in personam) or civil (i.e., in rem),
(iii) whether the government's interest "relates back" to a particular
point in time and, if so, whether that time is the date of the illegal act, the
date of seizure of the forfeited property, or some other date or event; (iv)
whether a secured creditor's lien is impacted differently if it is perfected
rather than unperfected, (v) what policies support or compel against for-
feiture of a secured creditor's interest, and (vi) whether there are statuto-
rily provided bars to prosecution which might, albeit vicariously, provide
protection to a secured creditor.7
II. FEDERAL LAW OF FORFEITURE OVERVIEW
RICO, the CCE, and the Controlled Substances Act were drafted as
an attempt to combat organized crime and "to deal in a comprehensive
3. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. As initially enacted, the Controlled Substances Act
contained a criminal forfeiture provision applicable to persons convicted of participating in continu-
ing criminal enterprises. This provision was codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988), and is frequently
referred to as the Continuing Criminal Enterprises Act. For a more detailed discussion of the his-
tory of § 848, see Smith, The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 303 (1988).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 1401-19 (Supp. 1990).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-101 to 2-503.2 (Supp. 1990).
7. While this article provides a general overview of RICO, the CCE, and the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, all of which provide for forfeiture under federal law, an in-depth review of' these statutes
and case law interpreting them is beyond the scope of the article. Numerous sources are available
which fully discuss the federal laws. See, e.g., Comment, Asset Forfeiture (Modern Anti-Drug
Weapon): Is Bankruptcy a Defense?, 25 TULSA L.J. 617 (1990); Comment, Tempering the Relation-
Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165
(1990); Comment, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471 (1989); Goldsmith and Linderman, Asset
Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1256; Smith,
The Scope of Real Property Forfeiture for Drug-Related Crimes Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act, 137 U. PA L. RaV. 303 (1988); Straffer, Civil Forfeitures: Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U.
FLA. L. REv. 841 (1985); Note, Federal Civil Forfeiture: An Ill-Conceived Scheme Unfairly Deprives
an Innocent Party of its Property Interest, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 87 (1984); Comment, Civil Forfeiture
and Innocent Third Parties, 1983 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323 (1983); Comment, Continuing Criminal
Enterprise Statute: Effect of Forfeiture Provisions on Third Parties, 22 DUQ. L. REv. 171 (1983).
[Vol. 26:445
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FORFEITURE STATUTES
fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States."'
Congress adopted the view that to successfully combat racketeering and
drug trafficking, it would be necessary for law enforcement efforts to "in-
clude an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the
mechanism through which such an attack may be made."9 However,
because of numerous limitations and ambiguities contained in these acts,
law enforcement agencies did not utilize them to the full extent contem-
plated by Congress. 0 As a result, Congress attempted to strengthen,
broaden, and clarify the provisions of these acts through amendments
contained in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.11
As they currently exist, these federal laws authorize two types of
forfeiture proceedings: criminal (in personam ) forfeitures, exemplified by
the provisions set forth in the CCE"2 and in RICO13 and civil (in rem)
forfeitures, exemplified by the provisions set forth in the Controlled Sub-
stances Act 4.
A. Criminal (in personam) Forfeitures Under RICO and the CCE.
Criminal forfeitures under RICO and the CCE are in personam pro-
ceedings in which an action is brought against a person charged with
violating RICO or the CCE for the purpose of determining the guilt or
innocence of that person. As part of the punishment for violations of
RICO or the CCE, if convicted, the defendant must forfeit property
tainted by that crime.
8. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, 4566, 4567.
9. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U. S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3182, 3374.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 3374-75:
Title III of [the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984]... is designed to enhance the
use of forfeiture, and in particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement
tool in combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeer-
ing and drug trafficking.... [S]ince the enactment in 1970 of [RICO] ... and the Compre-
hensive Drug Prevention and Controll (sic) Act... the Federal Government's record in
taking the profit out of organized crime, especially drug trafficking, was far below Congres-
sional expectations .... This bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and
ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement
agencies.
Id. This act moved the forfeiture provisions of the CCE to 21 U.S.C. § 853, and changed the forfei-
ture penalties so that they applied to all persons convicted of drug felonies.
12. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
14. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
1991]
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1. Property Subject to Forfeiture under RICO and the CCE
a. RICO
Originally enacted for the purpose of addressing problems posed by
organized crime, courts have broadly construed RICO to reach any
person convicted of investing in, acquiring control of, or conducting an
enterprise' 5 with money derived from a pattern' 6 of racketeering activ-
ity17. As part of the penalty imposed upon a person convicted of violat-
ing a RICO provision, the convicted person





(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a
source of influence over; any enterprise which the person
has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or par-
ticipated in the conduct in violation of [RICO] ... ; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racke-
teering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of[RICO] . . .. 18
This section goes on to state that the type of property subject to criminal
forfeiture under this provision includes:
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privi-
leges, interests, claims and securities.' 9
Thus, under RICO, any property which affords a source of influence over
a criminal enterprise, or which constitutes or is derived from the pro-
ceeds of such an enterprise, is subject to forfeiture.-
15. An "enterprise" may consist of "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although the group is not
a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
16. To establish a "pattern of racketeering activity" the Government must show at least two
acts of racketeering activity which occurred within 10 years of each other. Id. § 1961(5).
17. "Racketeering activity" means, inter alia, "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotics or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year." Id. § 1961(1).
18. Id. §§ 1963(a)(2)-(3).
19. Id. § 1963(b).
[Vol. 26:445
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The CCE provides that any person convicted of a violation of its
provisions which is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of State law -
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the per-
son obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such
violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person
shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in paragraph (1)
or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or con-
tractual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing
criminal enterprise.2°
This section, with language identical to that contained in section 1963(b)
of RICO,2 subjects both real and personal property to criminal
forfeiture.
Therefore, as is the case under RICO, the CCE provides that any
property which affords a source of control over a criminal enterprise or
which constitutes, or is derived from, the proceeds of such an enterprise
or violation is subject to forfeiture. In addition, any property which is
used in any manner to facilitate such a violation is also subject to
forfeiture.
2. Procedure for Forfeiture Under RICO and the CCE
a. RICO
A criminal forfeiture proceeding under RICO is conducted as part
of the criminal trial of a defendant whose guilt must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the defendant is convicted of the crime, the court
will then enter a judgment of forfeiture of the tainted property to the
United States and authorize the Attorney General to seize all such prop-
erty "upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper."22
20. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988).
21. IS U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1988).
22. Id. § 1963(e). In addition, following the order of forfeiture,
the court may, upon application of the United States, enter such appropriate restraining
orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory performance bonds, appoint
receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to
protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered forfeited. Any income
accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or interest in an enterprise which has been
ordered forfeited under this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses
1991].
5
Astle and McNight: The Impact of Forfeiture Statutes on Oklahoma Loan Transactions
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
After entry of the order of forfeiture, the government then must
"publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property in
such a manner as the Attorney General may direct."23 Unlike the corre-
sponding Oklahoma statute, discussed below, RICO contains no require-
ments for any type of recorded lien notice by the government. The
government "may" also, "to the extent practicable, provide direct writ-
ten notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the prop-
erty that is the subject of the order of forfeiture as a substitute for
published notice as to those persons so notified."24 Since the statute is
permissive, it does not require the notification of even secured creditors
whose interests in the property are recorded or otherwise known to the
government. The secured creditor, therefore, can neither assume that
perfecting its security interest by filing will protect its interest in the
property from forfeiture, nor assume that it will be given notice that the
property subject to its security interest is subject to an order of forfeiture,
other than the general constructive notice by publication required by
statute.25
The criminal proceeding under RICO establishes the rights of only
the defendant in the property, i.e., whether or not the defendant's interest
in the property will be forfeited. Accordingly, any claimant, other than
the defendant, who claims an interest in the property subject to the order
of forfeiture and intends to assert its interest, must petition the court for
a hearing, after the defendant has been convicted of violating acts prohib-
ited by RICO and after the order of forfeiture has been entered. This is
the earliest time that the validity of the claimant's interest in the property
can be adjudicated.26 Section 1963(i) of RICO provides that except for
to the enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect the interests
of the United States or third parties.
Id A court may also "enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory
performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability" of property subject to forfei-
ture, in certain circumstances, upon or prior to the filing of an indictment or information charging a
violation of RICO. Id. § 1963(d).
23. Id. § 1963I)(1). Section 1963(h)(1) gives the Attorney General the right to promulgate
regulations with respect to "making reasonable efforts to provide notice to persons who may have an
interest in property ordered forfeited under this section ......
24. Id. § 19630)(1) (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. Subsection 1963(1)(2) states that:
(a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been
ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may, within thirty days of
the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph (I), whichever is
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this post-judgment proceeding, no one claiming an interest in the prop-
erty may
(1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfei-
ture of such property under this section; or
(2) commence an action at law or equity against the United States
concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property subse-
quent to the filing of an indictment or information alleging that the
property is subject to forfeiture under this section. 27
At the post-judgment hearing the claimant must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property,
and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture in-
valid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was
vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior
to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the
property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title,
or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reason-
ably without cause to believe that the property was subject to for-
feiture under this section....
Since a third party cannot assert an interest in property subject to
forfeiture until after resolution of the criminal proceeding, such third
party claims could be delayed for years.29 For the secured creditor, this
could result in adjudication of its claim substantially beyond the time of a
default in the obligations secured, or delay for such a period as to allow
delapidation of the collateral, or other occurrences which significantly
decrease its value.
b. CCE
The proceedings for forfeiture under the CCE are substantially simi-
lar to those set forth under RICO, including the provisions for notifica-
tion that a judgment of forfeiture has been entered.3 0 The language of
the CCE, prohibiting a third party who claims an interest in the subject
property from intervening in the criminal action brought under the CCE
27. Id. § 1963(i).
28. Id. § 19630)(6).
29. For a more complete discussion of the history and disadvantages of this procedure, see
Goldsmith and Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law
Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254, 1282-91.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (1988). The language contained in subsection 853(n) is identical to that
contained in subsection 1963(1) of RICO. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
1991]
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or filing an action collateral to the CCE proceeding once an indictment
or information has been filed, is also identical to that set forth in section
1963(i) of RICO31 and provides only a post-judgment remedy for third
party claims. 32
3. Relation Back Under RICO and the CCE.
a. RICO
Under RICO, if a party acquires an interest in property which is
subject to forfeiture after the commission of the crime, even if the interest
is acquired before an order of forfeiture has been issued or notice of for-
feiture has been published or received, the acquiring party can preserve
its interest in the property only by petitioning for a hearing and proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that such party was a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of its interest in the property and that, at the time such
interest was acquired, the claimant was reasonably without cause to be-
lieve the property was subject to forfeiture.33 This result is reached on
the theory that the right, title, and interest of the United States in the
forfeited property "relates back" to the time the crime was committed
and is subject only to statutorily protected interests. Pursuant to section
1963(c) of RICO
[a~ll right, title, and interest in property [subject toforfeiture]... vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfei-
ture under this section. Any such property that is subsequently trans-
ferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to
the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant
to subsection (l) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such prop-
erty who at the time ofpurchase was reasonably without cause to believe
that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.34
This provision of RICO codifies the common law "relation-back doc-
trine", with only a few differences.
The common law relation-back doctrine was discussed at length by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stowell,35 a decision
rendered several years prior to RICO or the CCE, in 1890. In Stowell,
the Supreme Court stated the common law doctrine as follows:
31. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(k), (n) (1988). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(k), (n) (1988).
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
35. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
[Vol. 26:445
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By the settled doctrine of this court, whenever a statute enacts that
upon the commission of a certain act specific property used in or con-
nected with that act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect imme-
diately upon the commission of the act; the right to the property then
vests in the United States, although their title is not perfected until
judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of
the right of the United States at the time the offense is committed; and
the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and avoids
all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good
faith. 36
While RICO provides an exception for a bona fide purchaser for
value which is not contained in the common-law relation-back doctrine
delineated in Stowell, the common law and statutory versions of the doc-
trine effect the same result, that is, each allows the government's title to
the property to "relate back" to the time of the illegal act, even though
the government's interest in the property is not "perfected" (here, the
Stowell Court uses "perfected" to mean that legal title has transferred to
the government) until an order of forfeiture is entered.37 The effect of
this doctrine is to preserve the interest of the government against any
party who acquires title to or an interest in the property between the time
of the illegal act and the order decreeing forfeiture of the property.3"
Accordingly, any secured creditor's interest in the forfeiture property is
potentially jeopardized if it does not predate the illegal act. There is also
an issue as to the degree of protection, if any, afforded a secured creditor
even as to interests acquired and perfected prior to the illegal act. The
relation-back doctrine can effect particularly harsh and potentially devas-
tating results on any party unable to successfully assert a bona fide pur-
chaser status.3 9
b. CCE
The language of subsection 853(c) of the CCE is identical to that
contained in subsection 1963(c) of RICO.4 Therefore, as with RICO,
the CCE codifies the relation-back doctrine, which results in the title of
the United States, once "perfected" by an order of forfeiture, relating
back to the time of the illegal act. This subsection also, like section
36. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 16-17.
39. If relief is not obtained under these statutory provisions, a third party may still seek relief
through an administrative remission or mitigation procedure. Criteria governing remission and miti-
gation are set forth at 28 C.F.R. § 9.5 (1989). See also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
1991]
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1963(c) of RICO, establishes an exception to forfeiture for any transferee
of the subject property if that transferee can establish that (1) it is a bona
fide purchaser for value, and (2) that at the time of the purchase of the
subject property, such transferee had no reason to believe the property
was subject to forfeiture.4
B. Civil (in rem) Forfeitures Under the Controlled Substances Act
Civil forfeitures, such as those provided for in section 881 of the
Controlled Substances Act, are in rem proceedings in which an action is
brought against the property itself, rather than against the person ac-
cused of a crime. This result is based upon the legal fiction that the prop-
erty committed, or is tainted by, the crime. Under this fiction, the
property itself is "arrested" and forfeited because of its "wrongdoing".42
This is in contrast to criminal, in personam, forfeitures which are, as dis-
cussed above, penal in nature, for the purpose of determining the guilt or
innocence of the alleged perpetrator of the crime, and to punish those
convicted of wrongdoing by, inter alia, effecting forfeiture of property
used in or derived from that crime.
A civil forfeiture proceeding determines the rights of all parties
claiming an interest in the property in question, rather than just the
41. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988).
42. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974), rehg denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974). In Calero-Toledo the court traces the origins of civil forfeiture from English
common law to the present. Id. at 680-86. The origins of civil forfeiture are rooted in Biblical and
pre-Judeo-Christian practices,
which reflected the view that the instrument [which caused someone's death] . . . was
accused and that religious expiation was required .... The value of the instrument was
forfeited to the King, in the belief that the King would provide the money for Masses to be
said for the good of the dead man's soul .... When application of the deodand [meaning
"to be given to God"] to religious or eleemosynary purposes ceased, and the deodand be-
came a source of crown revenue, the institution was justified as a penalty for carelessness.
Id. at 681.
Under early English law, a crime amounting to a felony or treason was an act for which "cor-
ruption of blood attached." See United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied sub nom. Castagna v. United States, 449 U.S. 830 (1980), cert. denied sub noam. Berg v.
United States, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). Under the "corruption of blood" doctrine a defendant convicted
of a felony or treason completely forfeited all his real and personal property and the offspring of such
a defendant was divested of any rights to inherit property from such defendants. Grande, 620 F.2d
at 1038. This type of complete forfeiture is prohibited under the Constitution of the United States,
which provides: "The Congress shall have the Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no
Attainder of Treason shall work a Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attained." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. However, a less severe type of forfeiture, such as
that contained in RICO and the Controlled Substances Act, has been held to be valid. See Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-84; Grande, 620 F.2d at 1038-39. The Calero-Toledo Court stated that
" 'whether the reason for [forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced.'" Id. at 686 (citing Goldsmith-Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921)).
10
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rights and interests of the defendant, as in a criminal forfeiture
proceeding.43
1. Property Subject to Civil Forfeiture Under the Controlled
Substances Act
Under section 881(a) of the Controlled Substances Act, the follow-
ing types of property are subject to forfeiture to the United States:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of
value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of this subehapter,
all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negoti-
able instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to fa-
cilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property
shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest
of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner."
and
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the com-
mission of, a violation of this title punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
45
43. See generally Dobbins v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1878); Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. 268, 321-22 (1871).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
45. Ia § 881(a)(7) (emphasis added). The breadth of this forfeiture provision is evidenced by
case law. In United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989),
the court upheld the forfeiture of a house because the property owner sold two ounces of cocaine.
The court stated:
we [do not] find merit in any underlying 'de minimis' argument [made by the owner] that
the sale of a relatively small amount of cocaine does not warrant forfeiture of the house.
The so-called nexus test is not a measure of the amount of drugs or drug trafficking, and we
find the proportionality between the value of the forfeitable property and the severity of the
injury inflicted by its use to be irrelevant.
Id. at 1096. In United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, Containing 30.08 Acres, Bruce Town-
ship, Guilford City, N.C., 665 F. Supp. 422,425-426 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd sub nornL United States
v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988), the court used section 881(a)(7) to justify the forfeiture of
an entire 30 acre tract of land, notwithstanding the fact that the illegal activity occurred only in the
house, pool, and driveway located on the land.
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This provision effectively terminates any interest in the property other
than those which qualify under the exception set forth therein for an
innocent owner.46
2. Procedure for Civil Forfeiture Under the Controlled
Substances Act
A civil forfeiture proceeding, unlike a criminal forfeiture proceed-
ing, is separate from and independent of any criminal action against an
accused person.47 Neither a criminal action nor a conviction is a pre-
condition to civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substances Act. Be-
cause of the different standards of proof in each of these types of actions,
it is possible that a court could decide that the owner of certain property
failed to meet the burden of proof required to show a crime had been
committed "without the knowledge or consent of the owner", thus re-
sulting in forfeiture of the property, even when the defendant is acquitted
of the criminal charges or even when such charges were never brought
against the alleged perpetrator of the crime.48
A civil forfeiture action requires a substantially lower burden of
proof than that of a criminal forfeiture action. While the government
must prove ehch element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal proceeding involving forfeiture, the standard of proof the gov-
ernment must meet in a civil forfeiture proceeding is only one of probable
46. For a discussion of the innocent owner defense, see infra notes 52-59 and accompanying
text.
47. See Dobbins, 96 U.S. at 399; Miller, 78 U.S. at 321-22.
48. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 ("the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfei-
ture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense"); Dobbins, 96 U.S. at 401 (forfeiture "is at-
tached primarily to the distillery... without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or
responsibility of the owner"); United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 931 (1987)
Appellee's prior acquittal under the criminal forfeiture statute merely determined that the
government's proof failed to overcome all reasonable doubt that the sum of $28,500 should
be forfeited. Hence, issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not arise [in this civil
forfeiture proceeding and] by failing to repeal or restrict § 881 when it enacted § 853, Con-
gress evinced an intent to permit continued use of civil forfeiture in a case, as here, where
criminal proceedings are unsuccessful.
802 F.2d at 647 (citations omitted). Although the purpose of the Controlled Substances Act is to
cause the forfeiture of drug-tainted property and thus to attempt to render the business of drug sales
less profitable, Congress attempted to temper this goal by providing an innocent owner defense. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6)-(7) (1988). As Congress expanded the scope of property subject to forfeiture
under this act, it simultaneously expanded the protection of innocent owners under the act in an
attempt to mitigate the potential harsh effects which could result under the amended forfeiture laws.
For a discussion on the history of the broadening of section 881 forfeiture provisions and innocent
owner defenses, see Comment, Tempering the Relation-Bank Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach
to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. RE. 165, 167-71 (1990).
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cause4 9 that the property in question was illegally derived from or in-
volved in an act in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. 50 Once
this is established, any party claiming an interest in the property (which
arguably includes a secured creditor)51 must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that such claimant is within the class of interests intended to
be protected by the innocent owner defense.52
49. The Government may establish probable cause by demonstrating that reasonable grounds
exist for believing a link exists between the illegal activity and the property. United States v. All
Funds and Other Property Contained in Account Number 031-217362, 661 F. Supp. 697, 700-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). In this case the court stated that "reasonable grounds" was defined as more than
mere suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 700. Probable cause in the
forfeiture context has been defined as a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than
prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thou-
sand Dollars in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)(quoting United States v.
One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord United States v. A Single
Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate,
715 F. Supp. 355, 357 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The standard of proof required of the government in a civil
forfeiture proceeding is broader than that required under a criminal forfeiture proceeding. In fact, at
least one court has held that probable cause need be demonstrated only by "reliable evidence",
technical evidentiary rules being "irrelevant to the question of probable cause" in a section 881 civil
forfeiture proceeding. United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 899-900
(1st Cir. 1987). See also United States v. Property at 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1267
(2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting proof of probable cause based
on hearsay); United States v. Four Million Two Hundred Fifty Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 904
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986) ("circumstantial evidence can suffice to support a
finding of probable cause"); Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Dollars in United States Cur-
rency, 661 F.2d at 324-25; United States v. All Funds and Other Property in Account Number 031-
217362, 661 F. Supp. 697, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ('The government may prove probable cause by
direct or circumstantial evidence.").
50. See, eg., United States v. Dunn, 802 F. 2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S.
931 (1987) (citing United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1267). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) which is incorpo-
rated by reference into section 881. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988).
51. To establish that a party challenging a forfeiture action has standing to do so, such party
must claim ownership of or an interest in the property. See United States v. One Hundred Twenty-
Two Thousand Forty-Three Dollars ($122,043.00) in United States Currency, 792 F.2d 1470, 1473
(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. $47,875.00 in United States Currency, 746 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir.
1984); United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars
($364,960.00) in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 326 (5th Cir. 1981). In amending the Con-
trolled Substances Act, Congress stated that the term "owner" was to be broadly construed so as to
include "any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized," which
would include a secured creditor. Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 9518, 9522; United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Property, 660 F.
Supp. 483 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1987). Accord United States v. One Urban
Lot Located at 1 Street A-l, 865 F.2d 427, 430 (Ist Cir. 1989); In re Metmor Fin., Inc., 819 F.2d
446, 448 n.2 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a subsequent purchaser had standing); United States v. A Parcel of
Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding that possession, among other
things, is sufficient to satisfy the standing requirement).
52. See United States v. Premises Known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 1986). We
note here that under the Customs procedures, which are incorporated by reference into section 881
(see 21 U.S.C.§ 881(d) (1988)), a party who is an "innocent owner" and who claims an interest in
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It is unclear what steps a claimant must take in order to establish
the innocent owner defense and the courts have interpreted the provision
differently. Some courts have held that the innocent owner language of
the statute, "without the knowledge or consent of that owner", is to be
read in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive.5 3 Under the disjunc-
tive reading, a claimant must show either that it did not know of the
crime or, if it did know of the crime, that it did not consent54 to the
crime." Other courts have held that the language is to be read in the
conjunctive.5 6 Under the conjunctive reading, a claimant must show that
it did not have knowledge 57 of the crime and that it did not consent to
the crime.5' Therefore, under the conjunctive analysis, if the property
owner has knowledge of the illegal use of the property, the innocent
owner defense cannot be asserted, regardless of any steps which may
have been taken by the claimant to report or halt the crime. Finally,
some courts have taken the approach that a claimant, in order to estab-
lish the innocent owner defense, must have done "all that could be rea-
sonably expected" to prevent the crime.59
The procedures for seizing property subject to civil forfeiture under
property subject to forfeiture does have available to it an administrative proceeding which provides
that party with an opportunity to petition the Department of Justice for funds to ameliorate the
effects of the forfeiture of the property. This administrative proceeding is referred to as remission
and mitigation. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.7 (1989). Under the regulations providing for this proce-
dure, remission may be obtained when the petitioner has a valid, good faith interest in the seized
property, had no knowledge of the illegal activity, and took all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal
use of the property. Id. § 9.5(a).
53. See United States v. Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 49
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
54. For a discussion of what constitutes consent, see Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real
Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 471,
486-492 (1989).
55. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d at 1216-17.
56. See United States v. Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D.
Tex. 1988).
57. Several courts have held that the standard of knowledge to be applied is that of actual
knowledge. See United States v. Ten Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars ($10,694.00)
United States Currency, 828 F.2d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1987), overruled by Case of One 1985 Nissan,
300ZX, VIN: JNIC214SFX069854, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989), where the court stated that there
is "nothing in the plain language of § 881(a)(6) requiring courts to look to the objective rather than
subjective knowledge of the owner when determining whether forfeiture is proper .... [We] con-
clude that § 881(a)(6) envisions an actual knowledge inquiry." Id. at 234-35. Accord United States
v. Banco Cafetero Pan., 797 F.2d 1154 (2nd Cir. 1986); United States v. Four Million Two Hundred
and Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
58. For further discussion of conjunctive versus disjunctive interpretation of the innocent
owner language of section 881, see Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture
Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 471 (1989).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); United States v. One (1) 1982 28' International
Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1322 (1lth Cir. 1984). These courts, and others adopting this standard, rely
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the Controlled Substances Act are set forth in the Supplemental Rules
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.6°
3. Relation Back Under the Controlled Substances Act
As with RICO and the CCE, section 881 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act codifies the relation-back doctrine by providing that title to
the forfeited property vests in the United States at the time of "commis-
sion of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section". 61 However,
subsection 881(h) of the Controlled Substances Act, unlike subsections
881(a)(6) and (7) of this Act and unlike the relation-back provisions of
RICO and the CCE, does not contain innocent owner language. Because
of this, courts disagree over whether the relation-back provisions of sub-
section 881(h) effectively circumvent the innocent owner defense other-
wise available under subsections 881(a)(6) and (7).
Some courts have strictly constrUed the subsection 881(h) relation-
on Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663. Calera-Toledo involved the interpretation of a Puerto Rican statute
similar to that contained in section 881. In often cited dicta, the Court stated that:
it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected
to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same
might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of
the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to
conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added). The Court justified this holding on the grounds that, to "the extent
that such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent
of any wrong doing, confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater
care in transferring possession of their property." Id, at 687-88. The applicability of this dicta to
cases involving section 881, however, is at least questionable, since, unlike section 881 of the Con-
trolled Substances Act, the Puerto Rican statute contained no innocent owner defense. Therefore, in
interpreting this statute, the Court was merely speculating on what defenses an owner might have,
absent any statutory defense such as the innocent owner defense of subsections 881(a)(6) and (7).
60. The Controlled Substances Act provides that property subject to forfeiture may be "seized
by the Attorney General upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admi-
ralty and Maritime Claims by any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the
property." 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988). Under the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims (hereinafter the "Rules"), an action for forfeiture may be brought by a United
States Attorney's Office by filing a complaint with a United States District Court. If an action
appears to exist, that court will issue an order authorizing seizure of the property. If the property is
not released within 10 days after seizure, the government must promptly cause public notice of the
seizure to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the district. As with RICO and the
CCE, the Rules do not require the government to individually notify parties known to have an
interest in the property. Any person with an interest in the property must then file a claim within 10
days after seizure of the property or within the time specified in the notice. If this claim is not timely
filed, that party's interest in the property may be lost. This claim must assert the innocent owner
defense. The claimant/interested party must then answer the complaint filed by the government
within 20 days after filing its claim or risk losing its interest. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
28 U.S.C. Rules A-F (1988).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
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back doctrine, holding that once an illegal act has occurred, no one can
acquire an interest in the property superior to that of the United States,
due to the fact that subsection 881(h), unlike subsections 881(a)(6) and
(7), contains no innocent owner exception and therefore no such excep-
tion to this codified relation-back doctrine exists.62 As a result, under
this strict interpretation, no secured creditor, regardless of its innocence,
could acquire an interest in property subject to forfeiture superior to the
interest of the United States once the illegal act giving rise to forfeiture
has occurred. Other courts have held that the doctrine discussed in
Stowell 63 does not apply to section 881 of the Controlled Substances Act,
based on the interpretation that the section 881 forfeiture provision is
permissive rather than mandatory. 64
III. OKLAHOMA LAW OF FORFEITURE OVERVIEW
OCOPA and the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act are sup-
ported by the same policies as those underlying the federal laws discussed
62. See, eg., Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 248 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub noma.
Colorado Dep't. of Revenue v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1112 (1990), in which the court held that
while title of the government in forfeited property was subject to the innocent owner defense, any
interest of the alleged innocent owner in the property must vest prior to the illegal act; United States
v. $41,305 in Currency, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court, in dicta, stated
that illegal use of property "immediately vests title to the property in the sovereign and cuts off
rights of third parties to obtain legally protectible interests in the property"; United States v. One
Parcel of Real Estate Property, 660 F. Supp. 483, 487 (S.D. Miss. 1987), aff'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th
Cir. 1987), in which the court stated that "the property interest asserted by the claimant must pre-
date the right to forfeiture asserted by the United States, for it is well established that when property
is subject to forfeiture for violation of the law, title vests absolutely in the government on the date of
the illegal act. Seizure and a subsequent decree of forfeiture merely confirms the forfeiture that has
already taken place."
63. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
64. In United States v. Currency Totalling $48,318.08, 609 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g
denied, 612 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1980), the court distinguished, in a matter of first impression, the
application of the relation-back doctrine of Stowell to statutes mandating forfeiture as opposed to
statutes permitting forfeiture. The statute interpreted in Stowell required that the property "shall be
forfeited", whereas the statute interpreted in Currency Totalling $48,318.08 provided that the prop-
erty be "subject to seizure and forfeiture". Distinguishing between the "shall" language and the
"subject to" language, the court in Currency Totalling $48,318.08 held that the relation-back doc-
trine as set forth in Stowell "does not apply where the statute provides only for a possibility of
subsequent forfeiture". Currency Totalling $48,310.08, 609 F.2d at 213. Subsequently, courts inter-
preting the forfeiture provisions of section 881 have held that since the language of subsection 881 (a)
states that the property "shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States" that this provision is
permissive rather than mandatory and that, as a result, the Stowell relation-back doctrine is inappli-
cable. See, eg., United States v. Thirteen Thousand Dollars in United States Currency, 733 F.2d
581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Real Property Titled in Name of Shashin, Ltd., 680 F.
Supp. 332 (D. Haw. 1987); United States v. A Parcel of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. La.
1987). For a discussion supporting this more lenient application of the relation-back doctrine, see
Comment, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in
Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. Rv. 165, 183-196 (1990).
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above. OCOPA provides for criminal forfeiture and civil divestiture.
The Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act provides for civil forfeiture.
A. Criminal (in personam) Forfeiture Under OCOPA
OCOPA provides for criminal forfeiture of certain property, dis-
cussed below, as part of the punishment for a violation of any of the
provisions of section 1403 of OCOPA, which prohibits activities con-
ducted through a pattern of racketeering activity, or the collection of an
unlawful debt.65 As under RICO and the CCE, conviction is a pre-con-
dition to criminal forfeiture under OCOPA.6 6
1. Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture Under OCOPA
Any party convicted of violating any provision of section 1403 of
OCOPA must criminally forfeit to the state
any real or personal property used in the course of, intended for use in
the course of, derived from, or realized through conduct in violation of
Section [1403] ... of the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention
Act, including any property constituting an interest in or means of
control or influence over the enterprise involved in the conduct in vio-
lation of Section [1403] ....
Upon approval of the district court, all property forfeited in any
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1403 (Supp. 1990) provides that:
A. No person employed by or associated with any enterprise shall conduct or participate
in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity or the collection of an unlawful debt.
B. No person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an
unlawful debt, shall acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise or real property.
C. No person who has received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern
of racketeering activity, or through the collection of any unlawful debt, in which he
participated as a principal, shall use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the
proceeds or any proceeds derived from the investment or use of any of those proceeds in
the acquisition of any right, title or interest in real property or in the establishment or
operation of any enterprise....
D. No person shall attempt to violate or conspire with others to violate the provisions of
subsection A, B or C of this section.
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1403 (Supp. 1990).
67. Iad § 1405(A). "Real property" is defined by OCOPA as "any real property or any interest
in real property, including any lease of, or mortgage upon real property. Real property and bene-
ficial interest in real property shall be deemed to be located where the real property is located ... 
Id. § 1402(11).
"Personal property" is defined to include "personal property, or any interest in such personal
property, or any right, including bank accounts, debts, corporate stocks, patents or copyrights. Per-
sonal property and beneficial interest in personal property shall be deemed to be located where the
trustee, the personal property, or the instrument evidencing the right is located .... " Id. § 1402(8).
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such criminal proceeding under OCOPA must be disposed of by the At-
torney General or district attorney "as soon as feasible, making due pro-
visions for the rights of innocent parties"68 and
D. The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of forfeited property
imposed pursuant to the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Preven-
tion Act shall be applied as follows:
1. To a bona fide innocent purchaser, conditional sales vendor, or
mortgagee of the forfeited property up to the amount of his in-
terest in the forfeited property ... 61
The foregoing provision does not state that the proceeds from dispo-
sition of the forfeited property will be applied in the order indicated, that
is, first to bona fide innocent purchasers, conditional vendors, or mortga-
gees of the forfeited property. While this would be a preferable and rea-
sonable interpretation, it must be compared to Oklahoma's only other
forfeiture act, the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act, discussed be-
low, which expressly states that the proceeds under its forfeiture provi-
sion are to be applied "in the order indicated." The fact that the
coinciding provision of OCOPA does not contain this language raises the
question of whether the omission of such language in OCOPA evidences
the intent of the Oklahoma legislature to not establish an order of appli-
cation of proceeds, or whether this was merely an inadvertent drafting
omission. A court should apply proceeds in the order indicated, since
such an interpretation would maintain the integrity of the underlying
policy in preserving the interests of bona fide innocent purchasers and
mortgagees. Also, this would not benefit the government beyond the in-
terests and rights expressly given them by OCOPA.
2. Procedure for Criminal Forfeiture Under OCOPA
The procedures established for criminal forfeiture are set out in sec-
tion 1405(B) of OCOPA.70 As noted above, a pre-condition to criminal
forfeiture under OCOPA is that the defendant be convicted of a violation
of OCOPA. The statute further requires that a "special verdict contain-
ing a finding of property subject to forfeiture, specifying the extent of
68. Id. § 1410(A).
69. Id. § 1410(D). OCOPA defines an "innocent party" to include "bona fide purchasers and
victims". Id. § 1402(3).
70. Id. § 1405(B).
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such property and describing with specificity71 such property and the cir-
cumstances by which the property is subject to forfeiture" must be re-
turned and if any property which is described in the special verdict of
criminal forfeiture
b. has been sold to a bona fide purchaser for value,
*.. or
g. is subject to a valid security interest, to the extent of the security
interest, held by a bank, savings and loan association, credit union
or supervised lender licensed by the Oklahoma Administrator of
Consumer Credit, acquired prior to the lien notice provided
by section 1412 of OCOPA, then, the district court shall "order forfei-
ture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of the prop-
erty that is unreachable" by application of this provision.72
The foregoing provision, however does not address the situation in
which there is no other reachable property. Due to the use of the word
"unreachable" in reference to property subject to a valid security inter-
est, and the fact the state acquires the property subject to these other
specified categories of interests, the provision should be construed to pro-
hibit forfeiture of property subject to a valid security interest, but only to
the extent of such a valid interest.
As with RICO and the CCE, an order of criminal forfeiture autho-
rizes seizure by the Attorney General or district attorney of the property
declared forfeited.73 The terms and conditions for the time and manner
of seizure are to be determined by the district court.74
In addition to forfeiture, the district court may, after filing of an
indictment or information by the Attorney General or district attorney,
and after hearing and thirty (30) days notice and opportunity to partici-
pate to any person affected, enter restraining orders, injunctions, require
bonds, or take other protective action such as appointment of a receiver, if
the Attorney General or district attorney shows "by a preponderance of
the evidence" that such is necessary in order to preserve and protect the
property which is the subject of the criminal forfeiture proceeding.75
Further, as with RICO and the CCE, after entry ofjudgment, the district
court has the authority to enter restraining orders, injunctions, require
71. The term "specificity" is not defined by OCOPA and this lack of definition creates an un-
certainty as to the effect of special verdicts and subsequent lien notices which contain incomplete or
inaccurate descriptions of property. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
72. Id. § 1405(B)(2) (emphasis added).
73. Id. § 1407.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1406.
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bonds, or take such other action, including appointment of a receiver as
deemed proper in order to protect the property subject to the interests of
the state.76 The same protection of a lender with respect to its security
interest in the property is not set out with respect to the appointment of a
receiver; therefore, the rights of a lender to secure appointment of a re-
ceiver or commence a foreclosure proceeding should be expected to be
subject to the rights of the state under these provisions. It is not specified
if an injunction could prevent or delay a foreclosure proceeding or ancil-
lary appointment of a receiver, or if the state would simply be required to
enter its claim in the same manner as any other lienholder.
3. Relation Back Under OCOPA
In contrast to the federal forfeiture statutes, the interest of the state
in forfeited property under OCOPA does not relate back to the time of
the violative act or to the seizure of the property. Rather, it is "created"
by filing a lien notice as provided in OCOPA. While the lien notice filing
creates the interest, title does not transfer to the state at the time of lien
filing, but rather:
Upon the entry of a final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the state,
the title to the forfeited real property shall be transferred to the state and
[the judgment of forfeiture] shall be recorded in the official records of
the county where the real property or beneficial interest in it is
located."
The forfeiture judgment in fact vests title in the state, with relation
back, for priority purposes, to the lien notice filing in a manner similar to
the perfection by judicial condemnation procedure of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, discussed above. The statutory requirement that the judg-
ment be recorded is necessary to impart constructive notice of the
transfer of legal title from the record title owner to the government and is
consistent with state laws and title practice standards affecting judgments
purporting to either convey title to or which affect an interest in real
property.7
76. I
77. Id. § 1412(F) (emphasis added).
78. See, eg., OKLA STAT. tit. 12, § 706(A) (Supp. 1990), providing that the lien of a judgment
commences upon the date the judgment is filed in the office of the County Clerk; OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, §§ 181, 1278 (1981); OBA Real Property Section Title Standard 16.3 (1990), providing that
judgments of the district court awarding title to one spouse in a divorce action are effective to pass
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With respect to personal property interests forfeited or beneficial in-
terests therein OCOPA provides "the property shall be seized if not al-
ready in possession of the state and disposed of in accordance with the
Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention Act."7 9 Accordingly, the
transfer or vesting of title in personal property occurs with possession by
the state.
a. Effect of the State's Interest on Valid Security Interests
In order for property which is subject to a "valid security interest"
to be protected from forfeiture, the security interest must be "acquired
prior to the lien notice", s ° In contrast to RICO and the CCE, which, as
discussed above, provide that the right, title, and interest of the govern-
ment relates back to the time of the illegal act, and can be defeated only
by a bona fide purchaser for value, under OCOPA the interest of the
state does not relate back to a time prior to, but is rather fixed at, the
time a lien notice is filed by the state. OCOPA does not define "valid
security interest" for purposes of determining the rights, protections, and
interests of a secured party in property subject to forfeiture. Also, the
OCOPA provision does not specify whether perfection in accordance
with state law is necessary for the protection of a secured creditor's se-
curity interest, or if an unperfected security interest is afforded the same
protection, i.e., what is "valid." Another unresolved issue is whether the
competing interests of the state and the secured creditor, if perfection is
not required, would then be subject to state laws governing priority."
Two theories may be advanced in addressing the issue of perfection
of a secured creditor's interest for determining the degree of protection
afforded under OCOPA. Under the first theory, perfection is not re-
quired. In support of this theory, it may be argued that since the term
"valid" is not synonymous with "perfected" as between the parties to a
security agreement or mortgage (i.e., an unperfected lien may also be a
valid lien as between the parties), the OCOPA provision should not be
construed to require a perfected security interest in order to be pro-
tected. 2 Also, the state does not acquire any greater interest in the prop-
erty than the interests that the defendant had in the property, i.e., the
79. OKLA STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(F) (Supp. 1990).
80. Id. § 1405(B).
81. "Other things being equal, different liens upon the same property have priority according to
the time of their creation .... OKLA. STAT. tit. 42, § 15 (1981). The first mortgage filed for record
is superior. See, eg., Cassidy v. Bonner, 54 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1931); OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 15
(1981).
82. See, eg., Leche v. Ponca City Prod. Credit Ass'n, 478 P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1970), which
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lien is "on the... property of the person named in the notice... ,83 and
the state is not a bona fide purchaser for value and should simply be
subrogated to the rights, title, and interest of the person named in the
lien notice and the final judgment. This theory is based on the proposi-
tion that the statute should not be construed to allow the state to acquire
any greater rights in and to the property than the statute expressly pro-
vides at the time of filing the lien notice or any greater rights in and to
the property than those of the defendant at the time of the lien notice.
Under the second theory, perfection is required. In support of this
theory, it may be argued that a lienholder has an obligation to protect its
security interest from subsequently arising interests of third parties who
take steps to appropriately perfect their security interests, without
knowledge of the first interest, in and to property. Accordingly, since the
record is notice for purposes of a third party who may rely on it, and
since an unperfected security interest under state law is junior and
subordinate to a perfected security interest, the filing of the lien notice by
the state should establish priority of the state's lien over any unperfected
security interests in the property.
While the second argument is consistent with general priority prin-
ciples, it would not appear to be consistent with the intent of the
Oklahoma legislature in drafting the OCOPA statute which expressly re-
fers to security interests "acquired" prior to the lien notice and does not
refer to security interests "perfected". There is a definite distinction be-
tween "acquired" and "perfected" under Oklahoma law in reference to
liens and the relative interests of secured creditors. There are no
Oklahoma decisions construing this provision of OCOPA; however,
other jurisdictions in construing "bona fide" (as opposed to Oklahoma's
use of the word "valid") security interests under certain drug forfeiture
laws have been split on this issue.84
provides that an agreement is binding between the parties without recordation although it cannot
protect against the rights of innocent third parties unless it is recorded; Cassidy v. Bonner, 54 F.2d
234 (10th Cir. 1931), which provides that recording is not essential to the validity of a deed or
mortgage as between the parties. However, even if unrecorded, knowledge of the unrecorded mort-
gage or security interest prevents a third party from being a purchaser in good faith and such third
party would take subject to the unrecorded interest. See, eg., Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall,
52 F.Supp. 717 (W.D. Okla. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 152 F.2d 300 (1945), cert. denied sub
nor. Federal Nat'l Bank of Shawnee v. Continental Supply Co., 327 U.S. 803 (1946).
83. OKLA..STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(D) (Supp. 1990).
84. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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b. OCOPA Lien Notice Requirements
The lien notice required is provided by OCOPA as follows:
A. At any time after the institution of any civil proceeding or at any
time after thefiling of an indictment or information pursuant to the
provisions of the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention
Act, 85 the state may file a lien notice in the official records as may
be re'uired for perfecting a security interest for any given property.
Any lien notice filed pursuant to OCOPA is required to be signed by
the Attorney General or by a district attorney and in form promulgated
by the Attorney General.87 Any such lien notice must also include the
following information:
1. The name of the person against whom the proceeding has been
brought or who has been charged or indicted ... and any other
names under which the person may be known. [It] ... may also
name in the lien notice any enterprise that is either controlled by or
entirely owned by the person;
2. If known... the present residence and business addresses of the
persons named in the lien notice;
3. A reference to the criminal or civil proceeding stating that a pro-
ceeding pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Corrupt Orga-
nizations Prevention Act has been brought against the person
named in the lien notice or that the person has been charged or
indicted for a violation of this act, the name of the county or coun-
ties where the proceeding has been brought or the conviction was
made and any other lien notices filed, and, if known.., at the time
of filing the lien notice, the case number of the proceeding;
4. A statement that the notice is being filed pursuant to the provisions
of the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention Act; and
5. The name and address of the Attorney General or the district attor-
ney filing the lien notice.
88
As noted above, OCOPA requires that the lien notice be filed in the
same manner "required for perfecting a security interest for any given
property .... ,1 This imposes on the state the same specificity in descrip-
tion and recording requirements as are imposed on any other person
perfecting an interest in real or personal property. While there are no
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1401-19 (Supp. 1990).
86. Id. § 1412(A) (emphasis added).
87. Id. § 1412(B).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1412(A).
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cases reported which construe this requirement, the specificity in descrip-
tion required for purposes of an effective lien notice with respect to real
property, and, arguably, the special verdict discussed above, should be
interpreted to require a complete and valid legal description, sufficient to
satisfy title examination and statutory requirements for proper recording
and indexing, thus imparting constructive notice.
A description of real property in a mortgage is sufficient if it is
enough to cause a reasonably prudent person to investigate and if upon
investigation, the property subject to the mortgage may be identified.90
The description of personal property for purposes of Article 9 of the
Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code should comply with the descrip-
tion requirements of the UCC (except in the case of non-Article 9 per-
sonal property security interests such as those subject to Federal
Aviation Administration or title certificate lien notation requirements
which must satisfy other standards). The UCC provides that a financing
statement description of personal property is sufficient if a third party
can determine the property which is subject to the financing statement. 9'
A financing statement description of property need not be specific and it
is enough that it simply specify the "type" of collateral.92
If the description of the property subject to forfeiture (or divestiture,
discussed below) is not a complete and sufficient description, constructive
notice will not be effectively imparted by the state to either protect its
interest or determine creditors' rights and claims. Accordingly, without
a complete and sufficient description, the very purpose of a lien notice is
defeated. The state should not, in the event of a defective description of
the property or defective filing of the lien notice, be permitted to occupy
a position in relation to the property superior to that of others relying on
the public records.
c. Relative Priorities Subsequent to Lien Notice and Property
Subject to Lien Notice
Relative priorities and property subject to the lien notice are estab-
lished by OCOPA which also provides the time of creation of the state's
lien as follows:
90. Ehret v. Price, 122 Okla. 277, 254 P. 748 (1927); Varner-Collins Hardware Co. v. New
Milford Sec. Co., 49 Okla. 613, 153 P. 667 (Okla. 1915).
91. OKLA STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-110 (1981); Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Fairview State
Bank, 766 P.2d. 330, 333 (Okla. 1988).
92. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-402(1) (Supp. 1990); Security State Bank of Wewoka v. Dooley,
604 P.2d 153, 155 (Okla. 1979).
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D. From the time of its filing, a lien notice creates a lien in favor of the
state on the following property of the person named in the notice:
1. Any personal or real property owned by the person under any
name set forth in the lien notice which is situated in the county
where the notice is filed; and
2. Any beneficial interest of said property owned by the person
under any name located in the county where the notice is filed.
The lien shall commence and attach as of the time offiling of
the lien notice and shall continue thereafter until expiration, termi-
nation, or release of the lien. The lien created in favor of the state
shall be superior and prior to the interest of any other person in per-
sonal or real property or beneficial interest in said property, if the
interest is acquired subsequent to the filing of the notice.93
The description of property affected by a lien notice filing is substan-
tially broader in scope than the statutory description of property subject
to forfeiture. The broader scope of property subject to the lien notice is
logical since the lien notice is filed prior to concluding a criminal (or
civil) proceeding and, at the time of lien notice fling, the scope of the
property which will actually be subject to a special verdict ordering
either forfeiture or divestiture will not be known. Since the lien notice is
ineffective except as to property expressly provided by statute, and the
lien of the state commences and attaches as of filing, the state's interest
would not be protected if a more restricted description of property were
required prior to disposition and identification of the specific property
actually subject to forfeiture.
A lien notice does not affect the rights of any person named therein
to rents, avails, and proceeds of any property subject to forfeiture prior to
judgment of forfeiture. 94 The severing of this interest in property could
arguably result in a secured creditor's interest in property being bifur-
cated so that an assignment of rents, issues, and profits would be superior
to the state's interest, even though the secured creditor's interest in the
property itself could be subordinate. Any reliance on such theory, how-
ever, should be with knowledge of potential adverse judicial construc-
tion, and it is unlikely any title protection could be obtained under that
93. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(D) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 1412(H) states:
The filing of a lien notice shall not affect the use to which personal or real property or a
beneficial interest in it owned by the person named in the racketeering lien may be entitled
to or the right of the person to receive any avails, rents, or other proceeds resulting from
the use and ownership of the property, except for the conveyance of said property, until a
judgment of forfeiture is entered.
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scenario. This is particularly risky given the fact that the statute only
addresses the rights of the person named, and the notice is of record. It
should be expected that a subordinate secured creditor's interest therein
also would only be free of the state's interest during the pendency.
The lien notice statute of OCOPA is discretionary (i.e., "may " file).
The statute fails to address the effect of the state electing not to file the
lien notice and how that election impacts a secured creditor's interests.
While not addressed by OCOPA, if the state does not fie the lien notice,
the rights of the state subsequently created in the property should be
subject to the claims of intervening secured interests within the foregoing
provisions based on the statutory provision that the filing of the lien no-
tice is, in fact, the act which "creates" the lien of the state.
A question arises as to the significance of a secured creditor filing an
instrument perfecting a security interest "acquired" after institution of
civil forfeiture proceedings, or filing of an indictment or information by
the state. If the secured creditor has full knowledge of the proceedings,
indictment or information, or of the illegal acts of the borrower/defend-
ant forming the basis for such seizure, then, prior to a lien notice filing by
the state, the question is whether the secured creditor may rely on the
race notice concept set out in the statute ("filing" of the lien notice "cre-
ates" the lien), or is there any requirement of good faith, innocence, lack
of knowledge, or notice, either actual, constructive, or inquiry. Section
1405 clearly refers to interests "acquired prior to the lien notice" and
section 1412 clearly provides the lien of the state is "from the time of its
filing". This would seem to completely eliminate any such knowledge,
notice, good faith, or innocence standards.
d. Term of Lien Notice and to Whom it Applies
The Attorney General, or district attorney, as applicable, is required
to provide a copy of the recorded lien notice to the person named in the
lien notice within ten (10) days after it is filed of record.95 The copy is
required to be provided by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the
last-known business or residential address of the named person. Service
by publication is permitted only if service by certified mail is not
possible.96
A particular lien notice applies to only one person (notwithstanding
use of the plural form in subitem 2 above) and, if applicable, the names of
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enterprises, as permitted by the statute. A separate lien notice is required
to be filed for any other persons.97 The statute does not address the effect
of a defective lien notice, which purports to apply to more than one per-
son, on a secured creditor who subsequently acquires or perfects a secur-
ity interest. It is not known if the lien notice fails completely to impart
constructive notice; if it is without effect only as to the named persons; if
it applies to only the first named person; or if, in fact, it is sufficient to
give constructive notice of the state's interest.98 Clearly any secured
creditor who has any notice or knowledge of the additional parties
should conduct its business as if the lien notice is effective as to such
additional parties and requires releases and terminations as appropriate.
A lien notice filed pursuant to the requirements of OCOPA is valid
for a term of six years from the date of filing and a renewal lien notice
may be filed which would extend the term of the lien notice for six years
"from the date of its filing". 99 Only one renewal of the lien notice may be
filed and the statute does not address when the renewal must be filed or
the effect of filing a lien notice renewal after expiration of the initial six
year lien notice period."° Without question, the provision should be.
construed to require filing of a lien notice renewal prior to expiration of
the original lien term since one cannot renew that which has lapsed.101
A secured creditor should be able to rely on the statute in concluding
that any lien notice filed more than six years prior and not renewed by
filing of a lien notice renewal is completely without effect and the interest
of an intervening secured creditor in the property should be superior.
However, to avoid perfection and priority issues or disputes, and, as a
practical matter, prudent lenders and title examiners will require a re-
lease of the (purportedly expired) lien notice. Additionally, there are cer-
tain circumstances, discussed below, which will result in the effectiveness
of a lien notice beyond the six year term other than by filing a lien notice
renewal.
97. Id. § 1412(B) (5).
98. But see Matter of Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975), which addressed the listing
of multiple debtors on a UCC-1 financing statement. In that case, the financing statement filed with
respect to a partnership and identifying two general partners was subsequently held to be sufficient
notice with respect to interests in property of one of the general partners named.
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(I).
100. Id.
101. An Article 9 security interest becomes unperfected as against other interests when lapse
occurs. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-403(2) (Supp. 1990); Security Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of
Norman v. Dentsply Professional Plan, 617 P.2d 1340 (1980). OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 301(A) (1981)
provides that no suit, action, or proceeding to foreclose a mortgage or enforce other remedies may be
maintained after expiration of ten (10) years from the stated maturity of the last obligation secured
unless a written notice of extension is filed of record.
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e. Termination or Release of Lien Notice
If a "civil proceeding" (discussed below), as provided for in
OCOPA, which seeks forfeiture of property owned by the person named
in the lien notice is not instituted, then acquittal in the criminal proceed-
ing of such person or dismissal of the criminal proceeding will terminate
the lien notice. However, if a civil proceeding has been instituted for
divestiture, the lien notice will continue for the duration of the civil pro-
ceeding even though the criminal proceeding may be dismissed or the
defendant (identified in the lien notice) acquitted. 102 Accordingly, a lien
notice may continue for a period substantially longer than the above six
year term(s).
Any recorded lien notice may be released in whole or in part with
respect to any property described in it or with respect to any beneficial
interest in such property. The statute provides that such a release "may"
be filed in the appropriate county records. 10 3 While this is permissive,
prudent lenders and title examiners will require that the release be filed
for record.
A lien filing may also be released by the initiative of the person
named in the lien notice if no civil proceeding or criminal proceeding is
then pending. This procedure requires that the person named "apply to
the district court in the county where the notice has been filed for the
release or extinguishment of the notice" in which event "the district
court shall enter a judgment extinguishing the lien notice or releasing the
personal or real property or beneficial interest in it from the lien no-
tice"."° Further, even if a civil proceeding is pending against a person
named in a lien notice, the person named may enter a motion requesting
relief of certain property from the civil proceeding in which case the dis-
trict court may grant the relief at a special hearing:
1. If a sale of the personal or real property or beneficial interest in it is
pending and the filing of the notice prevents the sale of the property
or interest, the district court shall immediately enter its order re-
leasing from the lien notice any specific personal or real property or
beneficial interest in it. The proceeds.., shall be deposited with the
clerk of the district court, subject to the further order of the district
court; and
2. At the hearing, the district court may release from the lien notice
any personal or real property or beneficial interest in it upon the
102. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(K) (Supp. 1990).
103. Id. § 1412(T).
104. Id. § 1412(L).
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posting by such person of such security as is equal to the value of
the personal or real property or beneficial interest in it owned by
such person.105
Therefore, in the case of purchase money financing, secured credi-
tors are cautioned to not release funds to the seller if the property is
subject to a lien notice filing to be released in accordance with the forego-
ing. Instead the purchase money lender, at a minimum, should require
that the seller execute a consent for the transfer of the purchase money
proceeds, and then actually should transfer them, to the clerk of the dis-
trict court, in exchange for the order releasing the subject property from
the lien notice.
f Fraudulent and Preferential Conveyances Under OCOPA
With respect to disposition of property after filing of the lien notice,
OCOPA includes a fraudulent and preferential conveyance provision
which could be adverse to secured creditors. It provides that a convey-
ance, alienation, or disposition of personal or real property or an interest
in it will be treated as "a fraudulent and preferential conveyance" if the
"property or a beneficial interest in it... is conveyed, alienated, disposed
of, or otherwise rendered unavailable for forfeiture after the filing of the
lien notice . . . ."I' In the case of such transfer, the state may
institute an action in any district court against the person named in the
lien notice, the defendant in the civil proceeding, or the person con-
victed in the criminal proceeding; and the court shall enter final judg-
ment against such person or any beneficial interest in it together with
investigative costs and attorneys fees incurred by the state in the ac-
tion. If a civil proceeding is pending, such action shall be filed only in
the court where such civil proceeding is pending.' ° 7
The procedure for setting aside a fraudulent and preferential conveyance
is not provided by OCOPA.
B. Civil (in rem) Divestiture Under OCOPA
Civil proceedings under OCOPA are provided at title 22, section
1409 of the Oklahoma Statutes. As under its federal counterpart, civil
proceedings under OCOPA are not conditioned upon criminal convic-
tion and are not required to be ancillary to a criminal proceeding. The
105. Id. § 1412().
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civil proceeding is an independent action. As discussed above, the stan-
dard of evidence is substantially lower in a civil proceeding than in a
criminal proceeding; therefore, the state may find the remedies afforded
under the civil provisions of OCOPA satisfactory or even preferable to
protect societal interests. 10
The civil proceedings provision of OCOPA does not use the word
"forfeiture" in describing the relief which may be granted by order of the
court. OCOPA instead provides for a "divestiture" in which the Attor-
ney General, any district attorney, or any district attorney appointed
under the provisions of title 19, section 215.9 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
may institute civil proceedings against any person, for relief from con-
duct constituting a violation of any provisions of section 1403 of
OCOPA, as follows:
the district court, after making due provisions for the rights of innocent
parties, may grant relief by entering any appropriate order of judg-
ment, including:
1. Ordering any defendant to divest himself of any interest in any en-
terprise or any real property;
2. Imposing reasonable restrictions upon the future activities or invest-
ments of any defendant... ;
3. Ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise;
4. Ordering the suspension or revocation of a license, permit, or prior
approval granted to any enterprise by an agency of the state; or
5. Ordering the surrender of the charter of [such] corporation... or
the revocation of a certificate authorizing a foreign corporation to
conduct business within the state.10 9
In addition, the court may grant injunctions, restraining orders, or re-
quire bonds. 11 0
The fact that the civil proceeding does not provide for "forfeiture",
but rather requires, inter alia, "divestiture", and does not specify "to the
state" is significant. Given the abhorrence in the law for forfeitures,"1 '
108. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
109. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1409(A) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. See, eg., Midwestern Devs., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1967); Rush v.
United States, 256 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1958); State v. Fish, 747 P.2d 956 (Okla. 1987); State v.
Nesbitt, 634 P.2d 1306 (Okla. 1981); Willhite v. Willhite, 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976); Pirkey v. State
ex rel. Martin, 327 P.2d 463 (Okla. 1958); 1942 Chevrolet Auto. Motor No. BA-193397 v. State ex
rel. Cline, 191 Okla. 26, 128 P.2d 448 (Okla. 1942); Keeter v. State, 82 Okla. 89, 198 P. 866, 873
(Okla. 1921); One Hudson Super-Six Auto., Model J, No. 4197, Engine No. 39527 v. State, 77 Okla.
130, 136, 187 P. 806, 813 (Okla. 1920).
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and the constitutional constraints against forfeiture,112 it should be ex-
pected the provision would be strictly construed. If so, this should afford
a secured creditor greater flexibility in protecting its security interest in
the property subject to divestiture. Other provisions of OCOPA, how-
ever, refer to both civil proceedings and "forfeiture" within the same pro-
visions, creating potential confusion and ambiguity. 1
1. Distinction Between Forfeiture and Divestiture
Oklahoma statutory law does not provide a basis for establishing the
distinction between "forfeiture" and "divestiture", and there are no re-
ported Oklahoma cases addressing the distinction. However, pursuant to
title 22, Section 1419 of the Oklahoma Statutes, OCOPA is to be con-
strued, when the language of OCOPA is the same or similar to the lan-
guage of RICO, in accordance with the construction given to federal law
by federal courts. A federal court addressed this issue in United States v.
Bonanno Organized Crime Family.1 14
In Bonnano the U.S. District Court distinguished between "forfei-
ture" and "divestiture" in determining the appropriateness of certain
civil remedies under RICO. Divestiture was defined by the court as
"where the owner of the property retains the proceeds of its sale" while
forfeiture occurred "where the proceeds are retained by the govern-
ment". 15 In Bonnano, the government sought to deprive the defendant
of certain property without compensation. The court determined that
the provisions of section 1964 of RICO entitled "Civil remedies" author-
ized appropriate orders "including, but not limited to: ordering any per-
son to divest himself of" certain interests and that the court had
discretion in the fashioning of equitable relief.1 16 Accordingly, while
"not expressly authorized by the RICO statute because it does not con-
template compensation to the defendant, such relief would be authorized
112. See supra note 42, for a discussion of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. See also OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 15, which provides: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed. No conviction shall work a corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate: Provided, that this provision shall not prohibit the imposition of pecuniary
penalties."
113. See, eg., OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1412(E) (Supp. 1990).
114. United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd, 879 F.2d 20 (2d. Cir. 1989).
115. Id. at 1443 (citing Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969); see also United States v. Eight
(8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (defining forfeiture as
"divestiture without compensation of property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the
sovereign").
116. Bonanno, 683 F. Supp. at 1444.
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to the extent that it is an equitable remedy which furthers § 1964's reme-
dial goals." '117 The court held that "if the government succeeds
in... proving that the defendants have violated RICO, it would be within
the broad equitable powers of the Court to fashion relief requiring the
defendants to disgorge any ill-gotten gains"."' While the foregoing ex-
panded remedy of disgorgement should not be expected to be applied
since OCOPA and RICO are distinguishable on this issue by virtue of
RICO's inclusion (and OCOPA's omitting) the "including, but not lim-
ited to" language in the civil remedies provision, the distinction drawn
between divestiture and forfeiture should be applied. The court stated
that "[t]he government would not be entitled to an order depriving, with-
out compensation, the defendants of their entire interest in the enter-
prises at issue regardless of whether the property interest is tainted."' 9
If not so limited, "[s]uch relief would amount to a forfeiture and would
be unauthorized under RICO's civil remedies provision."' 20 In cases of
divestiture, "[t]he defendant receives compensation for the loss of the
interest although he may suffer some economic hardship as a result of the
divesture."121
A civil action under OCOPA does not preclude a civil or criminal
remedy otherwise provided under OCOPA or any other law. 22 In addi-
tion to other relief provided, OCOPA provides that the state may seek
civil relief in federal court under OCOPA or civil relief pursuant to any
comparable provision of federal law.123 The question of whether this al-
lows incorporation of the RICO provision discussed above as to divesti-
ture, or, if a narrower intent established in the state law precludes
application of an expanded federal remedy, is untested, i.e., judicial con-
struction is not available addressing whether the federal provision is
"comparable".
2. Lien Notice and Lis Pendens Notice
A lien notice, in accordance with the provisions discussed above in
the case of criminal proceedings under OCOPA, may be filed. In addi-
tion, section 1412(E) of title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides for
filing of a lis pendens notice of civil divestiture proceedings as follows:
117. Id. at 1448.
118. Id. at 1449 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id
121. Id at 1447.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1409(G) (Supp. 1990).
123. Id. § 1416.
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E. In conjunction with any civil proceeding:
1. The Attorney General or district attorney mayfile without prior
court order in any county a As pendens pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention
Act.... [A]ny person acquiring an interest in the subject real
property or beneficial interest in it after the filing of the lis
pendens, shall take the interest subject to the civil proceeding and
any subsequent judgment of forfeiture; and
2. If a lien notice has been filed, the Attorney General or district
attorney may name as defendants, in addition to the person
named in the notice, any person acquiring an interest in the per-
sonal or real property or beneficial interest in it subsequent to
the filing of the notice. If a judgment offorfeiture is entered in
the proceeding in favor of the state, the interest of any person in
the property that was acquired subsequent to the filing of the no-
tice and judgment offorfeiture shall be subject to the notice and
judgment of forfeiture.12 4
Accordingly, a lis pendens notice, or a lien notice as discussed
above, effectively establishes of record the interest claim of the state, and
the rights of third parties are subject to the notice imparted.
The simple running of the clock may not provide a secured creditor
any protection given the extended limitations period provided by
OCOPA. Section 1409(E) of OCOPA provides that a civil action "may
be commenced at any time within five (5) years after the conduct made
unlawful... terminates or the cause of action accrues." However,
[T]he running of the period of limitations ... with respect to any cause
of action of an aggrieved person, based in whole or in part upon any
matter complained of in any such prosecution, action, or proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency of such prosecution, action, or
proceeding and for two (2) years following its termination. 125
There are no reported cases construing OCOPA as of the date of
this article.
C. Civil (in rem) Forfeitures Under the Oklahoma Controlled
Substances Act.
The Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act1 26 was initially adopted
in 1971 and was modeled in substantial part on the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act. 27 It is based on the same policy goals set forth supra for
124. Id. § 1412(E) (emphasis added).
125. Id. § 1409(E).
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-101 through 2-608 (1981 & Supp. 1990).
127. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Acr § 505, 9 U.L.A. 35 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
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the federal Controlled Substances Act."12 Proceedings under the
Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act are civil in nature129 and the Act
does not include a provision for criminal forfeiture. 130
1. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under the Oklahoma
Controlled Substances Act
The Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act provides that certain
property, both real and personal property and interests in such property,
is subject to forfeiture for violation of that Act including, inter alia, the
following:
A. ....
4. All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, vessels, or farm
implements which are used to transport, conceal, or cultivate
for the purpose of distribution... or... to facilitate the trans-
portation or cultivation for the purpose of sale or receipt of
property described in... this subsection or when such property
is unlawfully possessed by an occupant thereof, except that:
a. no conveyance.., shall be forfeited... unless it shall appear
that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance
was a consenting party or privy to a violation of the Uniform
Controlled Dangerous Substances Act; and
b. no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this
section by reason of any act or omission established by the
owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of such owner, and if the act is commit-
ted by any person other than such owner the owner shall
establish further that the conveyance was unlawfully in the
possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States, or of any state....
8. All real property, including any right, title, and interest in
the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenance or
improvement thereto, which is used, or intended to be used,
in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the com-
mission of, a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substances Act which is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one (1) year, except that no property right, title or
interest shall be forfeited pursuant to this paragraph, by rea-
son of any act or omission established by the owner thereof
128. See supra notes 8 to 11 and accompanying text.
129. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-503, 2-506 (Supp. 1990); United States v. $3,799.00 in U.S. Cur-
rency, 684 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1982); State v. A 1977 Chevrolet Pickup Truck VIN CC
1447S187406, 753 P.2d 1356 (Okla. 1988); Moore v. Brett, 193 Okla. 627, 137 P.2d 539 (1943);
Keeter v. State, 82 Okla. 89, 198 P. 866 (1921).
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-501 (Supp. 1990).
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to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner.
B. Any property or thing of value... is subject to forfeiture if it is
established by a preponderance of the evidence that such prop-
erty or thing of value was acquired... during the period of the
violation... or within a reasonable time after such period and
there was no likely source for such . . . other than the
violation....
C. Any property or thing of value... if it is established by prepon-
derance of the evidence that the person has not paid all or part
of a fine imposed....
D. All items forfeited in this section shall be forfeited under the
procedures established in Section 2-506 of this title....
E. All 3roperty taken or detained . . . shall not be repleviable.
The Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act provides an "innocent
owner" defense in subsections 2-503(A)(4)(b) and 2-503(A)(8). There
are no cases reported under the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act
construing whether an "owner" includes a lienholder or mortgagee; how-
ever, at least one other jurisdiction has held it does not.132 Nonetheless,
in addition to the innocent owner provision, the Oklahoma Controlled
Substances Act provides for a claim and relief in the forfeiture proceed-
ings by lien holders and mortgagees, as follows:
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-503 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
132. See Commonwealth v. One 1978 Ford Van, Ford Motor Credit Co., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 760,
419 N.E.2d 1060 (1981), where the Appeals Court of Massachusetts considered the Massachusetts
Controlled Substances Act, modeled in part on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970. Unif. Controlled Sub-
stances Act § 101 through § 607, 9 U.L.A. (Master ed. 1988). Section 505 of the Uniform Act
provides in subsection (a)(4)(iv) that "a forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide secur-
ity interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if he neither had knowledge of nor consented
to the act or omission." Id. The Massachusetts court reflected on the history of the Massachusetts
statute, and the fact that several bills were introduced in Massachusetts to provide an exception to
forfeiture for the bona fide interests of a person without knowledge of the unlawful use. All of these
bills were rejected. One 1978 Ford Van, 419 N.E.2d at 1062. Based on this history of rejection of an
exception, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts concluded that the legislation was not intended to
include within the word "owner" a party holding a security interest. Id. at 1063. The court noted
that cases from other jurisdictions allowing relief to secured parties from forfeiture were based on
express statutory exceptions analogous to that contained in the Uniform Act. Id. (citing One 1957
Chevrolet v. Division of Narcotics Control, 27 Ill. 2d 429, 189 N.E.2d 347 (1963); One Cessna
Aircraft v. State, 90 N.M. 40, 559 P.2d 417 (1977); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Atkins, 204
Tenn. 700, 325 S.W.2d 270 (1959)). The lienholder claimant in the Massachusetts case had taken all
steps required by law to perfect its security interest in the subject property. However, the court
stated that the lienholder claimant was "charged with knowledge when it acquired its interest that
secured parties were not excepted from the effect of... forfeiture." One 1978 Ford Van, 419 N.E.2d
at 1064. Further, "the claimant must have foreseen and taken into account the occasional loss of a
security interest to forfeiture. Moreover, forfeiture does not extinguish the underlying debt which
remains enforceable against the maker of the note and any indorsers." Id.
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H. The claimant of any right, title or interest in the property may
prove his lien, mortgage or conditional sales contract to be a bona
fide or innocent ownership interest and that his right, title or inter-
est was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the
property was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged.
I. In the event of such proof, the court shall order the property re-
leased to the bona fide or innocent owner, lien holder, mortgagee or
vendor, if the amount due him is equal to, or in excess of, the value
of the property as of the date of the seizure, it being the intention of
this section to forfeit only the right, title or interest of the
purchaser.
J. If the amount due to such person is less than the value of the prop-
erty, or if no bona fide claim is established, the property shall be
forfeited to the state and sold....
K. Property taken or detained under this section shall not be
repleviable....
L. The proceeds of the sale... shall be distributed as follows, in the
order indicated:
1. To the bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional sales vendor
or mortgagee of the property, if any, up to the amount of his
interest in the property, when the court declaring the forfeiture
orders a distribution to such person...
M. Whenever any vehicle, airplane or vessel is forfeited.. .the district
court ... may order [that such] ... be retained by the.., agency
which seized [such]... for its official use. 133
The foregoing subparagraph M of section 2-506 does not address the
rights of the mortgagee; however, read in conjunction with the balance of
section 2-506 of the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act, it is reason-
able to'expect that a court would require disposition of the subparagraph
M property in accordance with the other provisions of section 2-506 in
order to protect the mortgagee's interest.
In summary, during these proceedings, a secured creditor claiming
an interest in the property must prove (i) its mortgage to be bona fide or
that it has an innocent interest; (ii) that it had no knowledge of the illegal
use of the property, and (iii) that it had no reason to believe there existed
such illegal use. The Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act does not de-
fine "bona fide", "innocent", "knowledge", or what constitutes "reason
to believe". Accordingly, a secured creditor must depend on uncertain
judicial construction to ascertain the practices and procedures necessary
for it to adequately protect in advance its security interest in property
133. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-506 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
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which is or may become subject to forfeiture under the Oklahoma Con-
trolled Substances Act.
2. Procedure for Forfeiture Under the Oklahoma Controlled
Substances Act
The procedures for forfeiture under the Oklahoma Controlled Sub-
stances Act are set out in section 2-506. In general, the property is sub-
ject to seizure by a peace officer, and notice of seizure and intent to
proceed to forfeiture proceedings are required to be fied in the office of
the clerk of the district court for the county where the property is seized.
A copy of the notice of seizure is required to be given to all "owners and
parties in interest" by one of the following methods:
1. Upon each owner or party in interest whose right, title or interest is
of record in the Tax Commission, by mailing a copy of the notice by
certified mail to the address as given upon the records of the Tax
Commission;
2. Upon each owner or party in interest whose name and address is
known to the attorney in the office of the agency prosecuting the
action to recover unpaid fines, by mailing a copy of the notice by
registered mail to the last-known address; or
3. Upon all other owners or interested parties, whose addresses are
unknown, but who are believed to have an interest in the property,
by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county where the seizure was made. 134
A "party in interest" is not defined by the Oklahoma Controlled Sub-
stances Act. However, read in conjunction with section 2-503(H), it
should be construed to include those persons (including, inter alia,
"mortgagee") listed in section 2-506(H).
The party receiving notice of seizure pursuant to the foregoing pro-
visions is given a period of sixty (60) days after the mailing or publication
date in which to file a verified answer and claim to the seized property
described in the notice. If at the end of such sixty (60) day period, no
verified answer has been filed, the court shall hear evidence and issue its
order whereby the property described in the notice will be forfeited to the
state upon proof. If, however, a verified answer is filed, the matter will be
set for hearing at which the burden of proof is on the state and the stan-
dard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.
135
134. Id. § 2-506(C).
135. Id. §§ 2-506(D)-(G).
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3. Relation Back Under the Oklahoma Controlled Substances
Act
The interest of the state is established at the time of seizure of the
forfeited property subject only to the rights of innocent owners and
lienholders as discussed above. Only one case has been reported constru-
ing these provisions of the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act. In For-
feiture of 1977 Chevrolet Pickup, 13 6 the Oklahoma Court of Appeals,
Division No. 2, held that a post-seizure lien was ineffective against the
state's right of forfeiture under the Oklahoma Controlled Substances
Act.' 37 In this case, on July 18, 1984, the owner of a pickup truck was
arrested for the unlawful delivery of marijuana and the owner's truck
utilized in the delivery impounded. Subsequently, the state sought forfei-
ture of the impounded truck. A bank (the "Bank") had made a loan of
money to the owner of the truck, and in consideration, took and
promptly perfected a security interest in the truck on July 26, 1984. It
was stipulated that the Bank had no knowledge and no reason to believe
that the truck had been previously utilized by the owner to violate
Oklahoma's drug laws. A notice of seizure and forfeiture was filed by the
state and served on the owner on August 3, 1984. The trial court denied
the forfeiture and found that the Bank was an "innocent mortgagee".
However, the state appealed and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals re-
jected the trial court's holding.
It was stipulated that at the time of the loan, the truck had been
seized and was in the physical custody of county authorities. The Bank
made no effort to inspect the truck. The state argued, in reliance on the
relation-back doctrine as set forth in United States v. Stowell, "I that the
transfer of the right to property by forfeiture statutes occurs "at the time
of the offense."' 139  Under this relation-back perspective, the state ar-
gued, a subsequent adjudication of forfeiture would merely perfect the
title in the government, which would relate back to the time of the of-
fense voiding all intervening transactions, even if entered into in good
faith. 140
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals noted that title 63, section 2-
506(H) of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that the "claimant of any
136. In re Forfeiture of 1977 Chevrolet Pickup v. Corner Stone Bank, 734 P.2d 857 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1987).
137. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2-503 to 2-506 (Supp. 1990)).
138. 133 U.S. 1 (1890).
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right, title or interest in the vehicle... may prove his lien, mortgage or
conditional sales contract to be bona fide." '141 Further, the secured party
must show that his "right, title or interest was created without any
knowledge or reason to believe that the vehicle... was being, or was to
be, used for the purpose charged."142 Note that the court does not say
"perfected" in accordance with laws governing perfection of security
interests.
The Court of Appeals stated that the statute clearly applied only to
those situations in which the claimant's interest was obtained without
knowledge that the forfeited property was used or would be used at some
time in the future for prohibited acts subject to the forfeiture statutes.143
The Court stated that it "does not cover a case where the interest is ob-
tained after the vehicle had been or was used for the purpose
charged." 1" The Court further noted the provisions of title 63, section
2-506(I) of the Oklahoma Statutes provide that an innocent lienholder
would receive the vehicle
if the amount due him is equal to, or in excess of, the value of the
vehicle ... as of the date of the seizure, it being the intention . . . to
forfeit only the right, title, or interest of the purchaser.145
When reading subsection (H) and subsection (I) together, the Court
of Appeals considered that the "State acquires the value of any right,
title, or interest of a defendant as of the date of the seizure, subject only to
bona fide or innocent secured creditors as may have existed prior to the
seizure".1 46 The court held that the post-seizure lien by the lienholder
claimant was ineffective against the interest acquired by the state by the
forfeiture. They rejected what was termed the "expansive rule of Stowell
and its progeny" on the basis that the Oklahoma Statute does not, by its
terms, support such an interpretation. 47 The Court of Appeals defined
the state's rights as "the defendant's unencumbered interest in the vehicle
as of the date of the seizure."148
In reaching this conclusion, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals noted
that the forfeiture statutes, which were the subject of the action at bar,
were subject to the interpretation provisions of title 63, section 2-603 of
141. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-506).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 858, 859.
145. Id. at 859 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-506) (emphasis added).
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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the Oklahoma Statutes requiring that the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act be construed "to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states which enact it."149 Based on this provision, the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals relied on State v. Crampton,15 0 in which the
Oregon Court of Appeals held that a post-seizure lien could not be cre-
ated in property which had been seized on the theory that "forfeiture
takes effect immediately upon the commission of the act" and "relates
back to that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even
to purchasers in good faith". 51 While the Forfeiture of 1977 Chevrolet
Pickup court relied on the holding of State v. Crampton, it did not follow
the Oregon court's reasoning in invalidating the lien at issue. Rather, the
court followed the reasoning of the special concurring opinion which the-
orized that "the pivotal time after which no further liens may attach is
the moment when the state takes physical possession of the vehicle." '52
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals further relied on State v. One Certain
149. Id. at 859, n.2.
150. Id.; State v Crampton, 30 Or. App. 779, 568 P.2d 680 (1977). State v. Crampton involved a
vehicle seized following arrest for an alleged narcotics offense and the claim of an attorney who was,
post seizure, granted a lien on the vehicle by the arrested owner. The question before the Oregon
Court was whether the arrested owner could, post seizure, grant an effective lien on the seized vehi-
cle to a third party superior to the state's interest in a forfeiture claim. The attorney-claimant had
full knowledge of the arrest and forfeiture. The certificate of title to the seized vehicle was noted
with the attorney's lien, and a new certificate of title issued by the State of Oregon. On the same day
the title was noted with the attorney's lien, the state filed its Motion for Order to Retain Vehicle
Pending Litigation. The trial court found that the attorney-claimant's lien was granted prior to the
state's Motion and that the attorney-claimant did not have actual knowledge that the state was
pursuing a formal action. Accordingly, the trial court held that the arrested owner could grant an
effective lien in his seized vehicle in favor of his attorney. Id. at 681.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon was unconvinced and reversed holding that "no post-seizure
lien can be created where the subject property has been thus seized, and that the attorney claimant's
lien at bar cannot prevail." Id. at 684. Further, "the only lienors protected from the forfeiture are
those whose liens attached prior to the illegal act or acts". Id. The Court of Appeals of Oregon
concluded that:
[T]he authorities in other jurisdictions uniformly hold that whenever a statute enacts that
upon the commission of a certain illegal act specific property used in or connected with the
act shall be forfeited, the forfeiture takes effect immediately upon the commission of the
act; the right to the property vests in the state, although its title is not perfected until
judicial condemnation; the forfeiture constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the state
at the time the offense is committed and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to
that time, and avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good
faith.
Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890); Simons v. United States, 541 F.2d 1351
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1957 Model Tudor Ford, 167 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.S.C. 1958);
United States v. One 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano Military R., 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1966);
People v. Grant, 52 Cal. App. 2d 794, 127 P.2d 19 (1942); Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546, 109
A.2d 623 (1954)).
151. State v. Crampton, 568 P.2d at 683-84.
152. Id. at 684. See also Forfeiture of 1977 Chevrolet Pickup, 734 P.2d at 859.
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Conveyance 1978 Dodge Magnum," 3 where the Iowa Supreme Court
held that the validity of a secured party's interest in seized property is
determined "as of the date of seizure." '154
The Forfeiture of 1977 Chevrolet Pickup court also relied on State v.
One 1978 Chevrolet Corvette, 5' in stating a policy basis for this interpre-
tation, as follows:
To permit the guilty owner to realize the value of the car by sale to an
"innocent" owner or by mortgage to an "innocent" lienholder after
seizure would defeat more than just the penal aspects of the statute. In
case of a sale there could be no forfeiture; in case of a lien there could
well be nothing left to forfeit. Either way the legislative intent to pe-
nalize the guilty owner would be frustrated.' 5
6
As discussed above, forfeitures are not favored, and Oklahoma has
adopted the position that forfeiture statutes are to be strictly construed
consistent with fair principles of interpretation and that forfeiture will
not be allowed unless the statutory provision is clear.15 7 Based on this
construction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court protected the interest of a
bona fide prior lienholder without knowledge of use of the seized vehicle
to illegally transport liquor. In so doing, the court stated that "to hold
otherwise would be to ascribe to the legislative department an indiffer-
ence to fundamental constitutional principles not warranted so long as
another construction is possible."'' 5 8
The holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Forfeiture of 1977
Chevrolet Pickup is consistent with the concept that notice, although not
necessarily actual notice, is required to determine the rights of innocent
parties in forfeited property. Possession of the property by the state
would impart at a minimum inquiry notice, causing a lender to investi-
gate further or, to utilize the words of another jurisdiction, this would
"excite suspicion". 59
153. 334 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1983).
154. Forfeiture of 1977 Chevrolet Pickup, 734 P.2d at 893.
155. 8 Kan. App. 2d 747, 667 P.2d 893 (1983).
156. 667 P.2d at 896.
157. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
158. One Hudson Super-Six Auto., Model J, No. 4197, Engine No. 39527, v. State, 77 Okla. 130,
187 P. 806, 813 (1920).
159. See Singleton v. State, 396 So.2d 1050, 1055 (Ala. 1981). Singleton involved seizure of a
truck used to transport marijuana, and a bank claim secured by a lien on the truck. The bank did
not have actual knowledge of the involvement by the truck owner in the alleged drug activity, nor
did it have knowledge of any fact calculated to "excite suspicion". Id. Accordingly, the Alabama
Supreme Court, relying on an Alabama Statutory provision which states that a "forfeiture of a con-
veyance encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if
he neither had knowledge of nor consented to the act or omission," held that the interest of the bank
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The interests of the secured party under the Oklahoma Controlled
Substances Act are determined at the time of seizure of the property and
interests acquired subsequent to seizure are not protected against the
claims of the state. Therefore, any secured party should inquire if suffi-
cient information is available to provide actual notice, constructive no-
tice, or inquiry notice; any of these could defeat a claim that the secured
party is a bona fide mortgagee or innocent party.
While the Oklahoma Controlled Substances Act does not by its
terms require that the mortgage or lien be perfected, judicial construction
is split. Certain jurisdictions have required perfection (by recording) in
order to protect the secured creditor's position.16 Other jurisdictions
have not required perfection in order to protect the secured creditor's
position.1 61
in the seized vehicle was not subject to forfeiture. Id. The court allowed the bank to recover from
the proceeds of disposition of the forfeited property but only "to the extent of any undersecured
debt; that is to say the Bank may recover to the extent that the outstanding debt now exceeds the
value of any remaining collateral." Id. This effectively imposed the duty on the secured creditor to
first pursue other collateral.
160. See, eg., State v. One Certain Conveyance 1978 Dodge Magnum, 334 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa
1983), in which the Iowa Supreme Court construed the Iowa drug forfeiture statute insofar as it
protected rights of a secured party. The court held "that the validity of a claimant's security interest
must be determined as of the date of seizure." Id. at 727. Further, only lien holders of record are
entitled to receive notice of the forfeiture hearing and recording (perfecting) the lien prior to seizure
was a condition to the protection of a lien holder's interest from forfeiture. Otherwise, the state's
interest is superior. The court noted that the holding "is consistent with the recording requirements
of the statutory... provision" applicable to the particular property (a vehicle, subject to certificate
of title notation perfection). Id. at 728. As a policy explanation, the court stated that a "contrary
holding, which would allow the lien holder to perfect his claim after seizure, would set the stage for
collusion between the conveyor of contraband and a bad faith claimant." Id. See also State v. One
1978 Chevrolet Corvette, 8 Kan. App. 2d 747, 667 P.2d 893 (1983), which involved a post-seizure
attorney's lien. The attorney-claimant had notice of both the offense and the seizure. That court
noted, albeit in dicta, that physical custody by the state might be sufficient constructive notice to
negate the bona fide and "innocent" requirements of the statute. Id. The court held that the lien of
a holder "acquir[ing] his interest after seizure and with actual notice [of a pending forfeiture pro-
ceeding] does not have a bona fide security interest" as required by the Kansas Uniform Controlled
Substances Act which provided that "a forfeiture of a conveyance encumbered by a bona fide secur-
ity interest is subject to the interest of the secured party if he neither had knowledge of nor consented
to the act or omission .. " 667 P.2d at 895, 897. The court concluded that the interest of the
attorney-claimant was subordinate to the interest of the state in the forfeited property.
161. See, e.g., State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989), in which the
Court of Appeals of Utah held that a "bona fide" security interest under the forfeiture statute, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(l)(e)(iii) (1988), required only "an actual, good faith interest in the property
not derived by fraud or deceit". 771 P.2d at 685. The case involved the forfeiture of an automobile
used for transporting drugs and the claim of the owner's grandparents to a security interest, albeit an
unperfected one. The trial court felt that it would be "unconscionable" to forfeit the interest of the
grandparents' as lien holders and held that the unperfected security interest was superior to the
interest of the state. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected the basis for the trial court's decision while
affirming the holding. Id. at 686. The Utah Statute provided that certain properties were subject to
forfeiture and further that "any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security interest is
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Section 2-413 of title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides that "If
subject to the interest of a secured party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable
diligence that a violation would or did take place in the use of the conveyance .. " Id. at 684.
In reaching its decision the Utah Court of Appeals relied on WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICrIONARY 250 (1986), defining "bona fide" as "made in good faith without fraud or
deceit" and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (5th ed. 1979), defining "bona fide" as "in or with good
faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." 771 P.2d at 685. The court further
expressed that "interpretation of the statutory [provision was consistent] with the purpose for the
forfeiture" laws in that
[T]he primary purpose is 'not to vest in the [state] an equitable interest in the property or
the proceeds of its sale, but is to prevent further unlawful use of the property by depriving
the guilty party of additional opportunity to so misuse it,' and the state accordingly loses
none of its rights when the property is seized, sold, and the proceeds paid to any innocent
party who can prove a bona fide interest therein.
Id. at 685-86.
The Utah Court of Appeals cited State v. Fouse, 120 Wis. 2d 471, 355 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1984), as holding "that although the holder of an unperfected interest could not prevent the
forfeiture, the holder was still entitled to compensation for his or her interest in the forfeited vehicle
after the forfeiture had occurred." 771 P.2d at 686.
The Fouse court also relied on MBank Grand Prairie v. State, 737 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987), which involved a bank's claim that its unperfected security interest in an automobile, forfeited
pursuant to the Texas Controlled Substances Act, was a bona fide security interest within the mean-
ing of the Controlled Substances Act. Considering the forfeiture statute, as well as laws controlling
the priorities of creditors, the court determined that the state was not within any class of creditors to
whom unperfected creditors are subordinate, and that the Texas Controlled Substances Act did not
elevate the state to any such class of creditor. The bank's security interest was created almost two
years prior to the forfeiture. The bank was not notified of the forfeiture proceeding and filed its
review over four months after the forfeiture by default. The Texas Controlled Substances Act pro-
vides that a "forfeiture of property encumbered by a bona fide security interest is subject to the
interest of the secured party if he neither had knowledge of or consented to the act which caused the
property to be subject to forfeiture." 737 S.W.2d at 425 (quoting TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4476-15, § 5.03(c) (Vernon 1976)). The bank had a valid unperfected security interest in the for-
feited property and it neither had knowledge of, nor did it consent to, the act causing forfeiture. 737
S.W.2d at 426. The court stated:
we do not find where an interest must be perfected to be "bona fide" under 5.03(c) of the
Controlled Substances Act. Secured creditors should not be required to compete with the
State for priority. The State's interest arises by operation of law. The State does not and
should not stand in the shoes of a good faith purchaser or a creditor who has given value.
Id. As noted above, under Texas law the state neither fell within any of the five classes of creditors
superior to the interest of an unperfected security interest nor did the Controlled Substances Act
provide a basis for elevating the interest of the state to a superior position. Dicta suggests a different
result would be possible if the law controlling creation of security interests in the subject property
required certificate notation or recording to create a valid lien. Id. at 426-27 (citations omitted).
Under Oklahoma law, a lien is created either by contract or by operation of law. OKLA. STAT. tit.
42, § 6 (1981). Any lien arising by operation of law arises "at the time at which the act to be secured
thereby ought to be performed". Id. § 7. If all other considerations are equal, different liens on the
same property have priority based on the time of creation of such lien. Id. § 15. Purchase money
real estate mortgages enjoy priority over all other liens against the purchaser, subject to recording
laws. Id. § 16. Among competing perfected security interests in real estate, Oklahoma is a race-
notice state and, barring other peculiarities, such as fraud, the first to record is superior. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 16, § 16 (1981). See also Cassidy v. Bonner, 54 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1932). The Oklahoma
Uniform Commercial Code provides for priority among competing security interests in personal
property. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-312 (Supp. 1990).
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a violation of this act is a violation of a federal law or the law of another
state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state." This bar to
prosecution is identical to section 405 of the Uniform Controlled Sub-
stances Act.162 While this statute has not been judicially construed in
Oklahoma, a substantially identical provision16 has been construed in
Illinois.
The Illinois Appellate Court in People v. One 1979 Chevrolet
Camaro "4 held that a forfeiture proceeding was not barred because of a
federal criminal prosecution since the forfeiture action is a civil in rem
action and is not dependent on a conviction. The court noted that the
bar to prosecution provision is limited to criminal prosecutions preclud-
ing "prosecution" whether "convicted or acquitted" in the first in-
stance. 6 Accordingly, secured creditors should not take comfort in the
fact that neither federal nor other state forfeiture proceedings have
reached property in which a secured interest is held or being created.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The civil and criminal forfeiture provisions of RICO, the CCE, the
Controlled Substances Act, OCOPA, and the Oklahoma Controlled Sub-
stances Act affect both real and personal property in Oklahoma. The
timing of the creation of the'government's interest in forfeited property
varies, both by statutes, and their judicial interpretation. Secured credi-
tors should be informed, and should make reasonable inquiries into the
use and operation of the property on which a security interest is to be
taken. Further, secured creditors should investigate the financial history
(including, inter alia, income sources) of the debtor and the property.
They should also inspect the property subject to the security interest, and
not delay in perfecting security interests. Inquiry should also be made
into the business and operations of the tenants or other third party users
of the collateral property, who could subject the property to forfeiture
through their activities. Clearly, however, even these steps may not pro-
tect against certain forfeitures.
162. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2-413 (1981); UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 405, 9
U.L.A. 35 (1971).
163. "Conviction or acquittal under the laws of the United States or of any state relating to
controlled substances for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this State". ILL. REV. STAT. 1979,
ch. 56, par. 1409. See People v. One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Il1. App. 3d 109, 420 N.E.2d 770,
771 (1981).
164. People v. One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Ill. App. 3d 109, 420 N.E.2d 770 (1981).
165. 420 N.E.2d at 772.
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